A Wrong Turn to Reasons? by Vayrynen, PP
promoting access to White Rose research papers
White Rose Research Online
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
This is the author’s version of a chapter published in New Waves in Metaethics
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/767474
Published chapter:
Vayrynen, PP (2011) A Wrong Turn to Reasons? In: New Waves in Metaethics.
Palgrave MacMillan , 185 - 207. ISBN 0230251625
http://www.palgrave.com/
A Wrong Turn to Reasons?*
Pekka VäyrynenUniversity of Leeds
1. IntroductionMuch  of  recent  meta-ethics,  and  meta-normative  inquiry  more  generally, displays a turn to reasons. In the air wafts a confidence, even if not a definite programme easily attributable to particular people, that appealing to reasons – in the normative sense in which reasons are good grounds for acting, thinking, or feeling in certain ways – will better enable us to account for various normative and evaluative phenomena than appealing to value or  any other notion.  This paper  argues  that  it  is  hard  to  reconcile  taking  reasons  as  fundamental  in explaining  various  evaluative  and  normative  phenomena  with  certain explanatory  demands  regarding  reasons  themselves.  Its  aim  is  to  sound  a sceptical note against the confidence that turning to reasons will offer special advantages in dealing with real theoretical problems when it comes to explaining various normative and evaluative phenomena. Section  2  sets  the  stage:  it  describes  why  evaluative  and  normative phenomena typically  call  for  explanation and what constraints  apply  to  such explanations under a turn to reasons. Section 3 quickly delineates some different forms which such explanations might take. Sections 4-7 then argue that various explanations of each form either fail to favor turning to reasons in particular or else are inadequate with respect to the constraints which apply to them, unless perhaps a kind of  reductionism about reasons,  which is  typically  rejected by those who favor turning to reasons,  is true. Their way of turning to reasons thus enjoys  no  special  advantages  over  other  ways  of  meeting  comparable explanatory demands regarding normative and evaluative phenomena. Turning to reasons offers no short cut.* Thanks to audiences at Universities of Birmingham, Leeds, and Oxford, and especially to Hanne  Appelqvist,  Michael  Brady,  Daniel  Elstein,  Geoffrey  Ferrari,  Joseph  Raz,  Jussi Suikkanen,  and anonymous referees,  for  helpful  discussions and comments regarding this  paper.  Support  is  acknowledged  from  the  European  Community's  Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 231016.
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2. Normative Explanation and ReasonsIt is widely agreed that nothing is brutely right or wrong, good or bad, admirable or terrifying, just or unjust. Things bear normative and evaluative properties in virtue of some other properties.  The distribution of normative and evaluative properties over these other properties seems neither accidental nor groundless; there should be some explanation of their distribution. If this piercing feeling in my neck is bad, that is no brute fact; or so I want to say. Suppose I say that the feeling is bad in virtue of being painful. This looks like an explanation: it specifies something because of which the feeling is bad, something that is at least part of 
why it  is  bad.1 But  now  I  have  another  evaluative  fact  to  explain.  For  the explanation that I gave presumes that the painfulness of the feeling makes it bad to some degree or in some way. The truth of this kind of evaluative claim isn't a brute fact either; or so I want to say.2 In virtue of what are such claims true, when they are true? Normative facts concerning reasons for actions or for attitudes are, on their  face,  no  different:  they  aren't  groundless  and  they  typically  call  for explanation.  Here I  mean “normative”  reasons:  units  or considerations which make systematic  contributions to,  and thereby explain,  the  overall  normative statuses  (such  as  'required,'  'permitted,'  'appropriate,'  etc.)  of  the  actions  or  attitudes for which they are reasons. Normative reasons can be stated by saying that some considerations are a reason, weaker or stronger, for some person in certain circumstances to do something.3 Such statements refer to a relation that 
1 So by ‘explanation’ I mean the content of an answer to a why-question, not the activity of giving such an answer. We may need to add that something counts as an explanation  only  if  it  also satisfies  certain epistemic conditions.  For  example,  it  may be  that  the content  of  an  answer  to  a  why-question  counts  as  an  explanation  only  if  it  is  (or  represents) a body of information which is structured in such a way that grasping that body of information would constitute a certain kind of epistemic gain regarding what is being explained. 2 Those who agree include e.g. Raz (2001: 50). Parfit (2006: 331) thinks the bedrock lies more shallow. 3 This isn't the only kind of reason predicate we deploy, even when talking just about normative reasons, in contrast to “motivational” and “explanatory” reasons. We can also talk of “overall” reasons to φ, based on taking into account everything that counts for or against  φ-ing  (although how to understand such talk  is  controversial),  as  well  as  of “sufficient” reasons to φ (see e.g. Skorupski 2006).
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holds between a proposition or a fact P, a set of conditions C, and an activity of φ-ing  (such  as  taking  a  course  of  action  or  adopting  an  attitude  like  belief,  intention, approval, etc.), when P is a reason (of degree of strength D, at time T) for someone in C to φ.4 When I talk about reasons, I have in mind this type of relation. When I talk about properties or features that “provide” reasons, I mean properties ascribed to things by the facts or propositions which slot in for 'P' in reason relations.  I'll  simplify  by  omitting  degree and time  references  and by taking “conditions” or “circumstances” to include the properties of agents. (This is harmless; normative reasons may still be held to depend on whether they bear some  suitable  relation  to  some  motivational  fact  about  the  agent.5)  Reason relations  can then  be  expressed  by  a  relational  predicate  R(P,  C,  φ).  Reason claims  of  this  form  entail  that  when  there  is  a  reason  to  φ,  there  must  be something that is the reason, something that speaks in favor of φ-ing or makes φ-ing sensible in C. This fact or proposition P will often be some ordinary fact or  proposition about the world. It will be a further normative fact about P that P is a reason to φ in C.6Now consider some specific examples. If the only way I can save my life is to jump out of the window, the fact that jumping will save my life is a reason to jump. If I promised my mother that I would call her, the fact that calling her will fulfill a promise is a reason to call her (but, one hopes, not the only reason). The fact that  there is loud music and chatter coming from across the street is,  in 
4 It is controversial to what ontological category the considerations that provide reasons belong, but there is a broad consensus that they are facts or propositions.  I keep the assumption disjunctive because although reason statements often specify facts that are the case, we can also talk about whether something would be a reason if it were the case,  and so statements of the form R(P, C, φ) aren't uniformly factive with respect to P.  5 Thus these simplifications don't prejudge debates between internalist and externalist  theories or Humean and anti-Humean theories of reasons. A huge literature is devoted to these  debates,  but  see  e.g.  Williams (1979),  Smith  (1994),  Dancy  (2000),  Schroeder (2007), and, for a useful survey, Finlay and Schroeder (2008). 6 The distinction between facts that are reasons and the normative facts that they are reasons is most explicitly  drawn by McNaughton and Rawling (2003).  For a relevant critical  discussion  of  some  work  on  reasons  which  plays  fast  and  loose  with  the distinction,  see  Olson (2009).  We  should  probably  make  the distinction tripartite  by adding another dimension: the source or ground of the normative fact that P is a reason to φ in C. 
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many circumstances, a reason to believe that the neighbors are having a party.  Many people would allow that the fact that parachuting is thrilling is, in many circumstances, a reason for those who desire a thrill to go parachuting. The truth of claims about what is a reason for what isn't a brute fact, I want to say. So we should again be able to ask in virtue of what these normative claims, when true,  are true.Suppose I say that the fact that jumping will save my life is a reason to jump because prudence requires me to save my life and that the fact that calling will fulfill a promise is a reason to call because morality requires me to fulfill a  promise.  These  explanations  presume  that  requirements  of  prudence  and morality distribute in a certain way over other facts.7 But their distribution isn't a brute fact, I  want to say.  Various facts about reasons call  for explanation as  much as any other normative and evaluative facts. Just as one wants not merely a list of valuable things but also an explanation of why value distributes in that way,  so  one  wants  not  merely  a  distribution  of  reason  relations  over  facts, circumstances,  and  actions  or  attitudes,  but  also  an explanation  of  why  that distribution is the one that holds.It feels difficult to find a satisfactory explanation of many of these sorts of  normative  and  evaluative  facts.  So  I  take  it  that  there  is  a  real  problem concerning their explanation.8 Would turning to reasons advance this enterprise? Such hope is in the air. For instance, some people find it hard to assess whether  something is of intrinsic value (roughly in the sense of Moore 1903) until they begin  to  consider  how  they  have  reason  to  act  or  feel  towards  it.9 Such  a 7 They also presume that the fact that prudence requires me to do something is a reason to do it,  and so is the fact that morality requires me to do something. Whether these  might be brute facts is unclear.8 The problem may be a generalization of the problem mentioned for the moral case in Pritchard (1912).9 Note  also  that  scepticism about  intrinsic  value isn't  uncommon,  but  in  the case of reasons one more commonly finds claims such as the following: “Genuine skepticism about . . . whether anything ever counts in favor of' anything else in the sense typical of  reasons . . . would be a very difficult position to hold” (Scanlon 1998: 19). Such claims  often  rely  on  the  thought  that  any  argument  for  scepticism about  reasons  for  belief would be self-defeating. But it seems not at all clear that an argument for the truth of the claim that there are no reasons for belief must be committed to the existence of reasons for believing its conclusion (cf. Olson 2009: 177).
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response suggests that reasons can be invoked to analyze or explain what it is to  be intrinsically valuable.10 But although the idea is in the air, little has been done to state it clearly. I'll articulate my target by describing different forms a turn to  reasons might take.It  is  common  to  claim  that  the  normativity  of  all  that  is  normative consists in its relation to reasons. But claims to this effect can be more or less inclusive with respect to the category of the normative.11 If 'normative' means 'deontic,' as contrasted with 'evaluative,' such claims entail only that reasons are fundamental  with respect  to other deontic  notions,  such as  right,  wrong,  and 
ought.  This  is  compatible  with  thinking  that  reasons  are  grounded  in considerations  of  value  or  explained  thereby,  or  that  neither  deontic  nor evaluative notions are explained by the other.12 If 'normative' includes also the evaluative (for instance, if value is, inter alia, such as to generate reasons), then taking reasons as fundamental  in the normative domain entails that they are fundamental with respect to other deontic and evaluative notions.13 My interest concerns this more inclusive turn to reasons.Irrespective of its scope, a turn to reasons can take at least three forms, depending on whether reasons are supposed to be conceptually, metaphysically, or  explanatorily  fundamental.  A  conceptual  turn  holds  that  the  concept  of  a reason is the fundamental normative concept, in the sense that this concept is the  sole  normative  element  in  any  normative  concept.  Most  of  those  who endorse this claim also take the concept of a reason to be primitive: it can be at most paraphrased, but not analyzed, in other terms, normative or otherwise. A 10 It  is  common  to  group  proposals  to  explain  value  in  terms of  the  “fittingness”  or “appropriateness” of a certain sort of response with a turn to reasons. I won't do this here,  because  fittingness  or  appropriateness  needn't  be  understood  as  a  function  of reasons or vice versa. Thus the claim that a certain response to something is fitting and the claim that there is a reason to respond to it in that way may not be equivalent. 11 Claims to this effect, but of varying determinacy regarding the scope of the normative,  can be found in Hampton (1998: 115), Scanlon (1998: 17), Raz (1999: 67), Dancy (2004:  ch. 1), and Schroeder (2007: 81). 12 For the first view, see e.g. Raz (1999: 1). The second is mentioned as an option in Dancy (2000: 29-30). It is perhaps endorsed by Crisp (2006: 62), but this isn't clear.13 Or, fundamental insofar as the normativity of these other notions is concerned. Some of these other notions might have non-normative elements which aren't exhausted by their relation to reasons. 
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common paraphrase is that a reason to φ is a consideration that “counts in favor” of  φ-ing.14 So  reasons  are  conceptually  fundamental  in  the  domain  of normativity. A  metaphysical  turn  to  reasons  holds  that  the  nature  of  normative properties of various sorts – moral rightness and wrongness, various forms of value,  or  whatever  the  normative  includes  –  has  to  do  with  the  relation  to reasons for actions or for attitudes. One local instance of a metaphysical turn is the claim that moral rightness (wrongness) consists in having properties that provide reasons of certain kind and strength for (against) action. If 'normative' includes the  evaluative,  then other  local  instances include the kind of  “buck-passing” account of value according to which to be good or valuable is to have  some other properties that provide reasons of an appropriate kind to favor their  bearers,15 and the view that such evaluative facts as that something is terrifying or that something is amusing consist in there being reasons of an appropriate kind  to  be  terrified  by  it  or  amused  by  it. So  reasons  are  metaphysically fundamental  in  the  domain  of  normativity  in  the  sense  that  the  nature  of normative properties, or at least their normativity, consists in their relations to reasons. An explanatory turn to reasons holds that normative notions are to be accounted for in terms of reasons. One local instance of this idea is the kind of “buck-passing”  view  of  value  according  to  which  the  fact  that  something  is valuable is explained by its having other properties that provide reasons of an appropriate kind to favor it. In general, insofar as evaluative and normative facts generally  call  for  explanation  in  the  way  discussed  above,  they  can  be understood  or  explained  in  terms  of  reasons  that  there  are,  in  certain circumstances, for actions or attitudes such as beliefs, intentions, or feelings. So reasons are explanatorily fundamental in the domain of normativity.Explanation of  normative  facts  might  not  be a  concern to all  of  these versions of the turn to reasons. A conceptual turn to reasons, for instance, might 14 See e.g. Scanlon (1998: 17) and Dancy (2004: ch. 1), among many others.15 See  e.g.  Scanlon  (1998:  95-100),  Stratton-Lake  and  Hooker  (2006),  and  Väyrynen (2006).
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not be troubled by a demand for such explanations. It allows that when some fact is,  in  some circumstances,  a  reason to φ,  there  is  an explanation why,  but  it  appears  to  carry  no  particular  commitment  as  to  what  explains  this.  It  is perfectly possible that the concept of a reason has no analysis in other terms, normative  or  otherwise,  and yet  picks  out  a  relation which consists  in some complex of independently characterizable factors, such as the promotion of value or of desire satisfaction, or the instantiation of which can be explained in some such terms.  The explanatory turn to reasons, however, is subject to the explanatory demand.  It  grants  that  various  normative  and  evaluative  facts  call  for explanation. Since the grounds for thinking that they do so seem to apply equally well to facts about reasons, then reasons also call for explanation. Much the same holds for the metaphysical turn to reasons insofar as it grants that normative facts to the effect that some fact P is a reason to φ in C aren't brute or groundless. My interest in what follows lies in an explanatory turn to reasons, understood to include this sort of a metaphysical turn. The idea of such a turn is in the air, even if no writer has fully articulated it or explicitly endorsed it in full generality. 16 How far an appeal to reasons in understanding various normative and evaluative phenomena  can  be  pushed  is  also  of  significant  interest  independently  of whatever actual currency the idea happens to enjoy. One  might  still  wonder  whether  it  really  is  reasonable  to  hold  an explanatory  turn  to  reasons  to  the  demand  that  there  must  typically  be  an explanation of why some fact P is a reason to φ in some circumstances C (or, for short, why a reason to φ is a reason to φ).17 One sort of thought is that reasons will need no explanation insofar as reason relations hold necessarily, when they 
16 The idea comes up in conversations. Skorupski (2006: 26) mentions it with approval. I  take the general tenor of the early chapters of Scanlon (1998) strongly to suggest it. See also Parfit (forthcoming, ch. 1). 17 This  kind of  explanatory demand is  compatible  with a  wide range  of  views about  reasons. It can be reasonable not merely if the concept of a reason is primitive, but also if  reasons are best explicated in terms of their role in explaining what one ought to do (Broome 2004) or in terms of their bearing on practical questions (Hieronymi 2005). If some fact forms part of an explanation of why one ought to φ, or part of an answer to the question whether to φ, then it is presumably not a brute or arbitrary fact that it does so.
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hold at all, and that at least the fundamental reason relations do hold necessarily.  (The particular facts that provide reasons often hold contingently when at all,  but contingent facts can stand in necessary relations.) Many  necessary  truths,  however,  call  for  explanation  and  don't  seem brute. One example is the widely accepted, if not uncontroversial, supervenience of  the  normative  on  the  non-normative.  Supervenience  relations  hold necessarily, when they hold at all, but most philosophers agree that if there can be no normative difference (and hence no difference in reasons) without a non-normative  difference,  this  requires  explanation.18 But  surely  it  isn't  the  mere number of metaphysical impossibilities in how reasons and non-normative facts may be recombined which makes supervenience require explanation.  Just the same  demand  for  explanation  applies  to  such  specific  claims  as  that  it  is metaphysically  impossible  that  the  entire  universe  could  be  exactly  like  it actually  is  in all  non-evaluative,  non-normative  respects  but  the  fact  that  my mother is my mother is a reason for me to torture her (Schroeder 2007: 71). But now notice that we are at least very close to thinking that reason relations also typically require explanation even if they hold necessarily. Why should they be special in requiring no explanation?Another  sort  of  thought  is  that  some  reasons  need  no  explanation because it strikes us as obvious that they are reasons. Suppose that the fact that a person's child has died is a  reason for her to feel  sad.  Or suppose that,  for  a person in control of a car, the fact that if the steering wheel isn't turned the car will injure or perhaps kill a pedestrian, but if the wheel is turned the car will hit  no  one,  is  a  reason to  turn the steering  wheel.19 If  these  claims strike  us  as obviously  true,  then  explanations  of  the  reasons  they  report  might  be superfluous  with  respect  to  many  epistemic  functions  which  explanations typically serve. 
18 See  e.g.  the  literature  on  the  “supervenience  argument”  against  moral  realism originated  by  Blackburn  (1971).  Many  writers  on  necessity  deny  that  there  are unexplained necessities (see e.g. Cameron forthcoming). 19 I owe these examples to T. M. Scanlon (The John Locke Lectures, University of Oxford, 2009).
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This doesn't, however, mean that a theoretical demand for an explanation of  reasons  is  out  of  place.  For  a  fact  may  be  obvious  and  yet  not  brute  or inexplicable. Nor does it follow that there is nothing more to say about why, or in virtue of what, a fact cited as a reason to φ is a reason to φ. To illustrate, suppose  that value is normative in the sense that something is good (bad) only if there are reasons to favor (or disfavor) it.  So far as this goes,  it  could be that it is  the goodness of something that explains the reasons to favor it or that some third factor explains both its goodness and the reasons, rather than that the reasons to favor  it  explain  its  goodness.  So  there  had  better  be  something  to  say  in explanation of these reasons which shows why explanations which don't involve turning to reasons are closed off. These  considerations  suggest  a  constraint  on  explanations  of  reasons under  an  explanatory  turn  to  reasons.  If  reason  relations  typically  require explanation but they are explanatorily fundamental relative to other normative and  evaluative  notions,  then  explanations  of  reasons  must  typically  satisfy  a “normative fundamentality” constraint: 
NF constraint: When a fact  P is under conditions C a reason to  φ, explanations of this normative fact may not appeal to any  evaluative  or  normative  factors  which  don't themselves concern reasons. 
The NF constraint is by no means trivial. It would be a substantive claim to say that every explanation of why P is a reason to φ in C is itself a reason, even if by other name. (Clear cases of this kind, as when a derivative reason is explained by the  reason  whence  it  derives,  don't  exhaust  explanations  of  reasons.20)  But insofar as explanations of reasons failed the NF constraint, reasons wouldn't be metaphysically or explanatorily fundamental in the normative domain. If reasons 
20 To a first approximation, P is a non-derivative reason to φ if P is a reason to φ but not (only) because some fact Q distinct from P is a reason to φ. Instrumentalist theories of practical reasons will typically count some instrumental reasons as non-derivative in this sense, which seems to be the right result. 
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to φ could be explained, for instance, in terms of the prospective value of φ-ing, then it wouldn't seem to be very plausible that what it is for φ-ing to be of value is for it to have other properties that provide reasons of an appropriate kind to φ. Or, if what it is for something to be a reason to φ were for it to play a role in explaining why one ought to φ, then it wouldn't seem to be very plausible that reasons are explanatorily fundamental  with respect  to what one ought to do, since their normativity would derive from that of ought.An explanatory turn to reasons can take different forms depending on what counts as an appropriate explanation of reasons. We saw that even if some evaluative  and  normative  facts  don't  call  for  explanation  relative  to  some epistemic functions of explanation, a demand for some other type of explanation can still be legitimate. One type of explanations which figure in understanding a wide variety of phenomena are “constitutive” or “grounding” explanations. These explain phenomena by laying out conditions in which those phenomena consist or in virtue of which they obtain. The fact that I am older than my sister consists  in my age, her age, and a certain ordering between them. And something is a member of the singleton {Pinky} by being Pinky, not Pinky in virtue of being a member of {Pinky}; the fact that something is a member of {Pinky} consists in the  fact  that  it  is  Pinky.21 If  reason  relations  aren't  explanatorily  brute  or groundless, a demand for a constitutive explanation of why P is a reason to φ in  C would often seem legitimate. Surely at least sometimes when such a reason relation holds, there will be conditions in which the fact that P is a reason to  φ in C is grounded or consists, or in virtue of which the reason relation holds.22 One might doubt that a demand for a constitutive explanation of reasons is typically legitimate. Contextually variable reasons clearly call for explanation. If some facts are a reason to φ in some circumstances but not others, then there should be some explanation as to why those facts are a reason to φ, when they 
21 See Fine (1995: 271).  Väyrynen (2009a) discusses several different kinds of relations which the term 'in virtue of' may be used to express.22 No uniform terminology exists here. Such relations as A consists in nothing more than B and A  is nothing  over  and  above  B get  called  “grounding” (Fine  2001:  15-16)  and “constitution” (Shafer-Landau 2003: 77), among other things. These locutions are usually meant to allow that A and B may be numerically distinct.
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are, and why they aren't a reason to φ, when not. But explanations in these cases might work by contrasting some cases in which those facts are a reason with other cases in which they aren't and by relating the case at hand to that contrast,  or they might work by laying out the circumstances in a certain kind of way or order.  Such  explanations  might,  in  other  words,  rest  on  coherence  relations among  various  non-normative  features  of  situations,  instead  of  appealing  to factors in virtue of whose presence or absence the facts in question are or aren't  a reason to φ. Even here, however, it seems to be legitimate to ask why some particular contrasts  or  differences  between  circumstances,  but  not  others,  make  for  a difference  in  what  certain  facts  are  a  reason  to  do  or  what  it  is  about  the particular contextual constellation of features which makes it the case that those facts are a reason to  do one thing and not a reason to do something else. How else  is  laying  out  the  circumstances  of  the  context  or  contrasting  them  with others supposed to explain why some facts are a reason to φ, if not by indicating 
why some contextual features or differences are relevant to whether those facts provide reasons? One might have thought the normative bedrock to run deeper than that. What I take away from all this is that it remains reasonable to demand that an explanatory turn to reasons provide constitutive explanations of why a reason to φ is a reason to φ which satisfy the NF constraint. One way to explain reasons  consistently  with  the  NF  constraint  would  be  to  show  that  reason relations reduce to some non-evaluative, non-normative properties or relations. (An example would be the view that the reason relation reduces to some non-evaluatively specified utility property,  such as happiness,  plus the maximising relation.)  Such  a  reduction  base  wouldn't  consist  in  evaluative  or  normative factors which don't themselves concern reasons. And yet, if As are reducible to Bs,  then  we  can  use  the  B-phenomena  in  the  reduction  base  to  explain  the reducible  A-phenomena (Horgan  1993).  Note  here  that  if  reasons  were  so reducible,  other  evaluative  and  normative  notions  might  be  reducible  in  a parallel way. A substantial question would remain whether those notions could 
11
also  be  systematically  explained  in  terms  of  reasons,  leaving  reasons explanatorily fundamental within the normative domain. In fact, however,  most of those who are sympathetic towards turning to reasons reject reductionism about reasons. They would therefore have to try to satisfy  the  NF  constraint  through  explanations  of  reasons  which  take  some different form. Much of the discussion to  follow works through various possible solutions to this problem. My focus will be specific: can an explanatory turn to reasons explain facts about reasons consistently with the NF constraint but without being pushed in the direction of reductionism? But the problem is a general one when it comes to explaining evaluative and normative facts under fundamentality constraints like the  NF  constraint.  Analogous  constraints  are  thus  likely  to  apply  to  other putative explanatorily fundamental factors in the normative domain. Much of the discussion to follow may thus generalize fairly directly to proposals to turn to other evaluative or normative notions. This wouldn't, however, affect the main upshot  of  this  paper,  which  is  that  turning  to  reasons  offers  no  distinctive advantage  in  solving  hard  and deep  problems  concerning  the  explanation  of normative facts.Some  readers  may  be  inclined  to  draw  the  further  moral  that  some suitably  sophisticated  reductionist  account  of  normative  and  evaluative properties is beginning to look like an attractive explanatory hypothesis. So long as our notion of reduction isn't Neanderthal, a reductionist account need involve no  implausible  semantic  claims,  nor  eliminate  the  reduced  property,  nor otherwise make it any less real.  Reductionism about reasons may or may not be true, but it isn't the bogey man that it is sometimes taken to be. 
3. Reasons and Explanation: Some DistinctionsPutative explanations of reasons can be classified along at least two dimensions. One concerns what kind of facts can be reasons. That is, what kind of facts may slot in for 'P' in R(P, C, φ)? The other concerns what kind of factors explain the (further,  distinct)  normative  fact  that  some  fact  P  is  a  reason  to  φ  in  C. 
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Distinctions  under  these  headings  can  be  used  to  generate  templates  for explanations of reasons.23 One distinction under the first heading is that the facts that  are  reasons  will  be  either  non-evaluative,  non-normative  aspects  of  the world or else at least partly evaluative or normative in character. One distinction under the second heading is that either the factors which explain why certain facts provide the reasons they do are distinct from those facts or they aren't.  Irrespective of whether these explanatory factors are distinct from reasons, they will  likewise be either non-evaluative,  non-normative aspects of  the world or else at least partly evaluative or normative in character. 
4. IntrinsicalityOne tradition in moral philosophy regards acts as duties simply because of the types of acts that they are.24 One way of  trying to explain why certain facts are reasons would be to generalize this idea and  say that some facts are reasons 
intrinsically  and other reasons are explained in terms of their relation to these. Something is intrinsically F if it has intrinsic properties in virtue of which it is F. For instance, the property being square is an intrinsic property and the property 
being square or married is an extrinsic property; but the latter is a property that all squares have intrinsically, in virtue of being squares.25 Similarly, G. E. Moore denies that being valuable is an intrinsic property but thinks that some things are intrinsically valuable: their value is intrinsic in the sense that they have it solely in virtue of their  intrinsic properties (Moore 1922: 260).  Since we can think of the claim  that something is F in virtue of some intrinsic properties as entailing that its possession of those properties at least partly explains why it is F, this strategy might be thought to fit with an explanatory turn to reasons. If  some  facts  were  reasons  intrinsically,  these  reasons  could  be  explanatorily 23 It is one thing to say that something is a reason to φ, another to say that it is part of  what  explains  why  something  is  a  reason  to  φ.  It  might  not  be  the  case  that  all explanations  of  reasons  to  φ must  themselves  be  reasons  to  φ.  But  if  so,  then  it  is possible for something to play the latter role without playing the former. 24 One example would be the notion of a basic  prima facie duty,  in the sense of Ross (1930: ch. 2).25 For this example and a useful survey of intrinsicness and intrinsicality, see Weatherson (2008).
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fundamental without  requiring a deeper explanation in terms of some  distinct further factors. If  some  things  are  reasons  intrinsically,  then  the  intrinsic  features  in virtue  of  which  they  are  reasons  will  be  either  non-evaluative  and  non-normative,  or  else  at  least  partly  evaluative  or  normative,  in  character.  Some evaluative  and  normative  facts  would  seem  to  be  good  candidates  to  be intrinsically  reason-giving  facts,  in  virtue  of their  particular  evaluative  or normative  character.  If  you have a right to physical  integrity,  this  might be a reason not to hit you, and if treating you in a certain way would be bad for you, this might be a reason not to treat you in that way. But unless these descriptions  of the facts are mere shorthand for claims about reasons,  the explanations of  reasons they provide violate the NF constraint.  And if they are shorthand for claims about reasons, the reasons to which they refer will require explanation. Thus an explanatory turn to reasons cannot allow reasons to be explained in terms of any evaluative or normative character that they might have intrinsically. So  might  any non-evaluative,  non-normative  features  be  reasons intrinsically? If  any were,  pain would seem to be a good candidate.  After all, nearly everyone agrees that if something is painful, that is a reason to avoid it or make it stop. But would it be plausible to claim that it is intrinsic to, or otherwise part of, what pain is that the fact that something is painful is (at least defeasibly) a reason to avoid it or make it stop?26 I have three distinct worries here. The first is that theories of pain tend not to support this kind of normative claim. For instance, most functionalist and other  physicalist  theories  of  pain  provide  no resources  for  defending  it.  The second  worry  concerns  errors  and  disagreement  about  reasons.  If  someone denies that the fact that something is painful is a reason to avoid it or make it  stop, it seems neither that their mistake is mere ignorance about what pain is, nor that our disagreement concerns merely the nature of pain. The third worry is that if the fact that something is painful were intrinsically a reason to avoid it or  
26 See Quinn (1993), Lance and Little (2006), and Heuer (2006) for remarks which seem sympathetic to this claim.
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make it stop, then painfulness would be a normative property. This would be a surprising metaethical commitment for an explanatory turn to reasons to carry. Furthermore, appealing to the nature of pain in explaining reasons would in this case seem to violate the NF constraint after all.27 The general point I am making doesn't require that all of these worries be effective with respect  to pain in particular,  but only that they generalize well enough to make it  doubtful  that  there  would be enough  intrinsically  reason-giving  non-normative  facts  to  explain  the  rest  of  the  reasons  there  are.  The worries raised above make this much doubtful. 
5. Evaluative Facts and ReasonsNext I'll  discuss the  role  of  evaluative and normative facts  in explanations of reasons. Such facts might figure in such explanations in two ways. First, some evaluative  and  normative  facts  might  count  as  reasons  in  virtue  of  their particular evaluative or normative character.28 For instance, it might be a reason to  go  shopping  today  that  there  are  lots  of  good  things  on  sale  today.  An explanation  of  this  normative  fact  would  presumably  rely  on  the  positively valuable aspects of the things on sale, not merely their price. (Otherwise reasons would turn us to the likes of Poundland and Dollar Store much more than they actually do.) And pointing out what is valuable about friendship might be a good way to explain why the fact that someone is my friend gives me reasons to act in  certain ways.  Second, the factors which explain why some non-evaluative, non-normative facts provide the reasons they do might be evaluative or normative in character. For instance, it might be that what explains why the non-evaluative fact that a holiday resort is pleasant is a reason to visit it and recommend it to  friends is that if a resort is pleasant, this makes it good in a certain way. So-called “value-based” accounts of reasons presumably take one or the other  of  these  forms.29 Unsurprisingly,  then,  each  is  inconsistent  with  an 
27 Unless,  surprisingly  indeed,  to  be  painful  is  to  have other  properties  that  provide  certain kinds of reasons. 28 See Raz (2001: 165-6), Wallace (2002: 448), Scanlon (2002: 513), and Dancy (2004).29 Different forms of value-based accounts of reasons can be found e.g. in Moore (1903), 
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explanatory turn to reasons,  unless the  claims about goodness  in the  reason statements or explanations of reasons which they offer are mere shorthand for claims about reasons.30 But this is unclear, to say the least.Suppose  that  the  following  may  in  some  contexts  be  an  adequate explanation of  what is  bad or inappropriate about taking pleasure in making others suffer:
In  taking  pleasure  in  the  suffering  of  others  one  is  displaying insensitivity to their  suffering,  and a  lack of  concern for  it,  which is particularly reprehensible if one is oneself the cause of the suffering, and could have prevented it. (Raz 2001: 52.)
This explanation could be taken to specify in what the badness of taking pleasure in making others suffer consists, at least proximately if not ultimately. It appeals to factors that have evaluative flavor, so it may be subject to further explanatory demands. As I have indicated, the explanatory issues at stake are general, not specific to reasons. What isn't easy to see, however, is what further illumination would be provided by saying that the fact that taking pleasure in the suffering of others would display insensitivity to their suffering, and lack of concern for it, is  a reason against doing so, and an especially strong reason if one is oneself the cause of the suffering. What emerges here is that if reasons are to be explanatorily fundamental in the normative domain, then neither things that are reasons nor factors which explain their status as reasons should involve evaluative or (non-reasons-based) normative  aspects  of  our  circumstances.  This  commitment  of  an  explanatory turn to reasons is further confirmation that it is subject to the NF constraint. The extent  of  (explanations  of)  reasons  which  are  most  plausibly  treated  as evaluative  in  character  –  and  with  it  the  plausibility  of  a  turn  to  reasons  –  depends on many controversial issues. Quinn (1993), Lawrence (1995), Raz (1999, 2001), Audi (2006), and Heuer (2006). 30 For instance, being a good-making feature would have to be nothing over and above providing certain kinds of reasons for actions or attitudes. 
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One way to illustrate the potentially wide sweep of this commitment is to consider  how  so-called  “thick”  concepts  and  properties,  such  as  generous, 
courageous,  brutal,  and  cruel,  matter  to explanations of  reasons.  A maximally non-committal  characterization  of  thick  concepts  is  that  they  have  some substantive non-evaluative content and their use is connected, in some close-knit way, with evaluation. According to a popular family of views, they are evaluative concepts whose applicability typically implies or signals the presence of reasons for action.31 What would an explanatory turn to reasons say about such reasons? It is a matter of dispute whether thick concepts and the properties they can be used to ascribe are evaluative in the same way as thin concepts, such as 
good,  right,  and  ought,  or  evaluative  at  all.  But  suppose  such  facts  as  that something is cruel or that it is generous at least sometimes provide reasons even if  they  aren't  evaluative  facts.  Those  reasons  would  presumably  require explanation. Thus, on the one hand, if thick concepts aren't evaluative but the properties they ascribe provide reasons, these reasons are among those which an  explanatory  turn  to  reasons  is  committed  to  explaining  either  in  non-evaluative, non-normative terms or else in normative terms which only concern reasons. For otherwise it will fail the NF constraint. If, on the other hand, thick concepts and the properties they ascribe are in themselves evaluative, then their bearing  on an explanatory  turn to  reasons  depends  on whether  or  not  their evaluative and non-evaluative aspects can be divided into distinct components. For instance, if generosity can be understood as the property of being disposed to  act  in  certain  ways  F1,  ...,  Fn (specifiable  in  wholly  non-evaluative  terms) towards others, and being good in a certain way for being so disposed, then it will  be  coherent  to  understand  this  latter,  evaluative  component  in  terms of reasons  provided  by  the  fact  that  something  has  or  would  manifest  such  a disposition. But if thick concepts cannot be understood in this way, then it would seem that the reasons provided by the properties they ascribe will have to be 
31 See Williams (1985: 128-9, 140-1) and much of the literature following his discussion.  Against this, Väyrynen (2009b) presents linguistic evidence that the evaluations which are typically conveyed by the application of thick concepts aren't located in the sense (or content) of thick concepts.
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explained in evaluative terms.32 So if thick concepts are evaluative, they can be used  to  explain  reasons  consistently  with  the  NF  constraint  only  if  their evaluative  and  non-evaluative  aspects  are  separable.  This  would  be  a controversial substantive commitment. A further worry about reasons associated with the applicability of thick concepts  concerns  their  explanation  under  the  NF  constraint.  Suppose generosity is a complex property divisible into two components: a disposition to act in certain ways towards others plus there being reasons to respond to people in  certain  favorable  ways  in  virtue  of  their  having  or  manifesting  this disposition.33 This might seem to be able to explain why the fact that someone is generous implies reasons to respond to it in certain favorable ways. For such a fact is now understood in terms of the existence of reasons to respond favorably plus  a  specification  of  what  provides  those  reasons.  But  what  explains  why having or  manifesting the  disposition provides the  reasons  that  it  does?  The normative  element  of  generosity  itself  merely  states  that  it  does.  The  NF constraint  requires  that  the  explanation  either  be  non-evaluative  and  non-normative or else that it appeal to some other factors concerning reasons. In short, an explanatory turn to reasons faces exactly the same questions that  arise  for  any  account  of  thick  concepts  and  comes  with  controversial commitments regarding thick concepts insofar as these come with reasons. But,  for  all  that,  it  seems to  provide  no distinctive  advantage  in  answering these questions or explaining these reasons. 
6. Non-Normative Explanations of ReasonsWe  have  seen  that  explaining  reasons  consistently  with  the  NF  constraint requires that  the facts that are  reasons be non-evaluative, non-normative facts. Thus, reasons to go to a concert will be such things as that doing so would be  
32 This claim is developed and endorsed by Stratton-Lake and Hooker (2006: 152). 33 This is to understand the fact that something is generous as an existential fact that there are reasons, given by certain properties, to respond to it in certain favorable ways.  On  the  buck-passing  account  of  value,  the  fact  that  something  is  good  is  a  similar existential fact. Such existential facts about reasons can be derivative reasons. 
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stimulating or fun, reasons to add a certain spice to what one is cooking will be  such things as that adding it would bring out, balance, or complement such-and-such flavors of such-and-such other ingredients, and so on. And we have seen why the status of such facts as reasons cannot be explained in other evaluative or normative  terms.  I'll  now  discuss  whether  their  status  as  reasons  can  be explained in non-evaluative,  non-normative  terms or else in normative terms concerning reasons.The most straightforward version of the former, non-normative option is the claim that the fact that P is a reason to φ in C consists in P, C, and φ. No doubt reason relations are in some sense grounded in their relata. But surely merely listing  their  relata  fails  to  explain  them,  unless  something  about  the  relata explains why they are so related. The clearest such cases are factors that have evaluative or normative content, insofar as these might be reasons intrinsically. But on the present view the reason relata are to be described in non-evaluative, non-normative terms. So this option is unpromising for an explanatory turn to reasons.A  better  way  to  assess  the  prospects  for  non-evaluative  constitutive explanations of why P is a reason to φ in C is to consider the properties of such explanations.  Even if  we don't  understand exactly what it  is  for  something to consist in some conditions or obtain in virtue of them, or how explanations that appeal to such a relation work, we know some things about what the relation isn't like. One example (an unsurprising one, given that supervenience relations often require explanation themselves) is that the supervenience of reasons on the non-normative as such isn't  enough to furnish it.  Even if there can be no difference in reasons without a non-normative difference, this alone determines no particular distribution of reason relations.  It entails the existence of some reason relations to begin with only if reasons nihilism is false.34 For if there were 
34 This can be seen by considering the antecedent in the standard formulation of weak and  strong  property  supervenience  of  the  normative  on  the  non-normative.  Strong supervenience holds that: [(∃x)(B*x & Ax) ⊃ (∀y)(B*y ⊃ Ay)], where 'A' stands for a normative property and 'B*' stands for the “total” non-normative base property.  Weak supervenience drops the second necessity operator ('').  The antecedents of these supervenience  claims  hold  only  if  something  has  the  normative  property  A;  
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no  reasons,  it  would  follow  trivially  that  if  two  cases  differ  with  respect  to reasons, they must also differ in some non-normative respect. Even  if  we  conjoin  supervenience  with  substantive  normative assumptions to the effect that some particular non-normative way things are is co-instantiated with a particular reason relation, reasons won't be explained by their supervenient character. For supervenience provides only a non-symmetric and  purely  modal  sort  of  determination,  whereas  explanatory  relations  are asymmetric and not purely modal.35 Facts can be determined, in that sense, by conditions which don't constitute or explain them. For example, given a coarse tripartite division of the space of temperature conditions,  being neither hot nor  
cold  determines  being warm (Oddie 2005: 153).  But clearly the latter doesn't consist in the former. Thus factors F1,  ...,  Fn can well fail to explain why P is a reason to φ in C even if this reason relation cannot fail to hold when F1,  ...,  Fn obtain.  This  means  also  that  truth-makers  of  reason claims may not  provide constitutive  explanations  of  them.  The  literature  on  truth-making  nearly uniformly assumes that if an entity α makes a proposition P true, then α couldn't exist without P being true. Such necessitation isn't enough for explanation. But what more there might metaphysically be to the truth-making relation is rarely discussed.Supervenience  can  be  used  to  illustrate  one  further  constraint  on constitutive explanations. The supervenience base for any property can be taken as a disjunction of every possible minimally sufficient set of conditions for the instantiation of that property. But it would be a significant theoretical cost if the distribution of reason relations over non-evaluative, non-normative features of the  world  had  only  a  fundamentally  disjunctive  explanation.  For  that  would mean that the reasons in this distribution would have nothing distinctively in common.  Moreover,  the  supervenience  relation  itself  allows  each  disjunct  to include an extremely broad set of non-evaluative features, or even, at the limit, normative  nihilism  denies  this.  Varying  the  modal  strengths  of  the  necessity  operators generates different versions of these supervenience claims.35 These claims aren't in dispute in the supervenience literature. See e.g. McLaughlin and Bennett (2008).
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all of the non-evaluative features of the entire possible world in question. But being forced to allow that P's being a reason to φ in C may consist in the entire world being a certain non-evaluative way F1, ..., Fn would seem to be a significant theoretical cost. For that would be to allow that constitutive explanations may fail to differentiate those aspects of the world in virtue of which P is a reason to φ in C, those in virtue of which Q is a reason to ψ in D, and so on. The conditions which constitutive explanations select as those in which P's being a reason to φ in C consists must also support the modal properties of reasons. Recall from section 2 the idea that it is metaphysically impossible that the entire universe could be like it is actually in all non-normative respects, but the  fact  that  my  mother  is  my  mother  is  a  reason  for  me  to  torture  her (Schroeder 2007: 71). Whatever reasons the fact that my mother is my mother gives me, the conditions in which these reason relations consist should support metaphysical impossibilities of this kind where they hold. And if some reason relations hold necessarily, the conditions in which their holding consists should support their necessity. In sum, then, if reason relations have constitutive explanations in non-evaluative,  non-normative  terms,  there  are  strong  reasons  to  think  that  the conditions in which the various reason relations consist aren't  fundamentally disjunctive  and  that  this  constitutive  relationship  isn't  purely  modal  but  can support or ground the sorts of modal features that reason relations may have. These constraints can be met if reason relations are reducible to non-evaluative and non-normative properties or relations, since there will be no other way for P to be a reason to φ in C than for P, C, and φ to have these properties or stand in these relations, and nothing else will be required for them to do so.36 But it is hard to see what a plausible account of constitutive explanations of reasons in non-evaluative,  non-normative  terms,  but  one  which  doesn't  push  towards  a reductionist account of reasons, could look like. Other explanatory domains don't readily suggest a model for such explanations.  
36 For a sustained defence of reductionism about reasons along these lines, see Schroeder (2007: ch. 4).
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An  independent  consideration  against  the  plausibility  of  constitutive explanations  of  reason  relations  in  non-evaluative,  non-normative  terms concerns  their  fit  with  the  “autonomy  of  ethics,”  the  thesis  that  there  is  no reasonable inference,  deductive or non-deductive,  from purely non-evaluative, non-normative  premises  to  evaluative  or  normative  conclusions.  Ordinary normative  discourse  obeys  this  constraint.  For  instance,  if  we  see  someone realize that jumping out of the window is the only way they can save their lives and infer that this fact is a good reason for them to jump, we tend not to think that  they  have  drawn  a  terrible  inference.  We  tend  instead  to  interpret  the inference  charitably  as  implicitly  relying  on  further  evaluative  or  normative premises, such as that their life is worth continuing and that one has a reason to take the necessary means to worthwhile courses of action.37Explanatory relations may not  themselves be inferential  relations.  But one would still expect that if A explained B, this would say something about what would be reasonable or good about an inference B from A. If P's being a reason to φ  in C consists in conditions  F1, ..., Fn, one would expect there typically to be a reasonable, even if non-monotonic, inference from F1, ..., Fn  to R(P, C,  φ), even if such  an inference were  unavailable  in  our  pragmatic  situation.38 If  so,  and if reason relations had constitutive explanations in non-evaluative, non-normative terms, the possibility of reasonable inferences from such premises to evaluative or normative conclusions would seem to follow. These  considerations  push  naturally  towards  reductionism  about reasons.  For  if  reason relations  were  reducible  to  some  non-normative,  non-evaluative properties and relations,  then the connections that  underwrite the reduction could perhaps be used to indicate, consistently with the autonomy of ethics,  what  would  be  reasonable  or  good  about  the  relevant  inferences.  37 See Sturgeon (2002). As Sturgeon notes, similar inference barriers seem to appear in many other domains. For an extended discussion of inferring 'ought' from 'is' without such auxiliary premises,  see Zimmerman (2010: ch.  5).  (I  am here ignoring the well-known “cheap” counterexamples to the autonomy of ethics.) 38 At  least  insofar as  such explanations  are  abductive  or  non-monotonic,  there is  no reason to suppose that they would always have to predict or retrodict the holding of particular reason relations. A perhaps related point is that explanation of reasons is one thing (theoretical), deliberation about what to do is another (practical).
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Otherwise it isn't easy to see what features of those inferences would make them so.  I conclude that I can see no plausible account of explanations of reasons in  non-evaluative,  non-normative  terms  which  satisfies  the  NF  constraint  on explanations  of  reasons  without  naturally  pushing  in  the  direction  of  a reductionist account of reasons. 
7. Explaining Reasons in Terms concerning ReasonsMy argument so far pushes an explanatory turn to reasons to the claim that the facts that are reasons are non-evaluative, non-normative facts, and their status as reasons can be explained by appeal to normative factors concerning reasons. I'll now discuss three strategies for trying to construct plausible explanations of this kind which might also satisfy the NF constraint.39One sort of normative factor concerning reasons which could be used to explain reasons is the set of conditions under which something is a reason to do something.  To satisfy  the  NF constraint,  such  conditions  cannot  be  stated  in some further normative terms. For instance,  it would be ineligible to say that when P is a reason to φ in C, this is because P plays a role in explaining why one  
ought to  φ.  Such conditions must  also be stated in informative  terms,  not  in terms which do little more than paraphrase reason talk. For instance, it would be 
39 Another strategy, which I cannot discuss properly here, is to argue that what explains why P is occurrently a reason to φ is that P has a disposition to be a reason to φ in C and the  circumstances  C  obtain.  (For  a  discussion  of  such  “normative  dispositions,”  see Robinson 2006.) But I suspect that the arguments I have given so far can be applied also against  taking such normative dispositions as the fundamental units of explanations of  reasons. If properties are the sorts of things that can have dispositions to begin with, it  might be plausible that some evaluative and normative properties are disposed to give  reasons to φ in C in virtue of their particular evaluative or normative character; but this would violate the NF constraint. It seems much harder to motivate the idea that non-evaluative, non-normative properties are disposed to give reasons to φ in C. That certain such properties bear such a normative disposition isn't a brute fact, I want to say. But  what in such properties would explain why they are so disposed? This question might  have a satisfactory answer if normative dispositions were reducible to a non-evaluative,  non-normative basis that explains why the disposition is manifested when it is.  But I  don't see how an appeal to normative dispositions that doesn't involve reductionism can help explain reasons consistently with the NF constraint. But no doubt these doubts are too quick and deserve further discussion.
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either insufficiently informative or in violation of the NF constraint to say  that when P is a reason to φ in C,  this is  because those who consider P  would be motivated to φ if they were fully informed and rational. This explanation isn't informative if  talk of  informed rational motivation merely paraphrases talk of reasons.  But  if  the  notion  of  informed  rational  motivation  is  sufficiently independent  of  the  notion of  a  reason to  explain the  status  of  some facts  as reasons, then such explanations violate the NF constraint. For the fundamental explanatory  work  in  such  accounts  isn't  done  by  normative  reasons.  Rather, reasons will be a function of the desires of fully informed agents whose overall mental  economy satisfies various rational  requirements of  coherence and the like.40 It seems doubtful that there will turn out to be further normative reasons to be rational in this sense. Another  sort  of  normative  factor  concerning  reasons  which  could perhaps be used to explain reasons is a certain sort of substantive claims about reasons. One idea along these lines is that it is part of the notion of a reason that certain  non-evaluative,  non-normative  facts  stand  in  reason  relations.  For instance,  perhaps reason relations are by their  nature such that  the fact that something is painful is a reason to avoid it or make it stop. But this seems too strong. One widespread feature of normative discourse is that when a pair of speakers find out that they favor very different sorts of things, they tend not to think that they have different enough normative concepts to be talking past each other.  Rather they tend each to think that  the other has mistaken or at least  idiosyncratic normative views.41 This, I take it, is how someone who denies that something's being painful is a reason to avoid it or make it stop would usually be classified. I also don't find it convincing that such people, although they share a concept of a reason with us, would have to be classified as mistaken about what reasons  are,  rather  than  as  mistaken  simply  about  what  considerations  are reasons for what. 
40 For an analysis of normative reasons in such terms, see e.g. Smith (1994: ch. 5).41 For one recent discussion of this point and some of its implications, see Merli (2009).
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A different way of appealing to substantive claims about reasons would be to explain why particular facts are reasons by subsuming them under general  principles to the effect that certain facts are a reason to φ  in C. But, even apart from the question whether a particular normative fact can sensibly be said to consist  in,  or  hold  in  virtue  of,  a  general  normative  principle  plus  suitable particular non-normative facts, this strategy would commit an explanatory turn to reasons to a surprising range of controversial implications. It would require some  sort  of  “covering  law”  theory  of  explanation.  It  would  imply  that particularist accounts of reasons are false. And it would carry a commitment to some particular set of substantive principles about reasons.  Most importantly, however,  this  strategy  would  only  push  the  explanatory  problem  a  level  up. General principles which specify what is a reason for what,  necessary or not, seem no more brute or groundless than particular facts about what is a reason for what. So this strategy won't help. A third sort of factor concerning reasons which could perhaps be used to explain reasons is some metaethical account which takes reasons to be a certain kind of function of a certain kind of collection of judgments about reasons. This general idea can be developed in different ways. One is constructivism. On this view, the normative fact that P is a reason to φ in C is constituted by the fact that taking P to be a reason to φ in C would withstand scrutiny from the standpoint of  all  the  other  normative  judgments  endorsed  by  the  agent.42 Another  is expressivism. On this view, to judge that P is a reason to φ in C is to express a certain kind of psychological attitude, and such a judgment counts as correct if it belongs to a set of such attitudes that cannot be, in a certain sense, improved upon.43 
42 See  especially  Street  (2008),  and  the  works  cited  therein,  and  Korsgaard  (2009). Constructivists of this sort don't usually think that the attitude of taking something to be a  reason  can  be  characterized  in  non-normative  terms,  but  only  in  certain  sorts  of  primitive normative terms (see Street 2008: 239-42). It may be relevant to note that this kind of view wouldn't seem to furnish a transcendental argument to the effect that if there are to be any reasons at all, there must be reasons for thinking along the lines of  some procedure for determining what reasons there are for particular agents to do what.43 See e.g. Blackburn (1988) and Gibbard (2003: 188-91).  Although expressivists think that what reasons one has can only be assessed against a standpoint constituted by other  
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The  only  point  I  can  make  here  about  these  views  is  dialectical. Constructivism and expressivism apply equally to reasons and other evaluative and  normative  notions  and  nothing  in  discussions  of  constructivism  and expressivism which touch on the relevant explanatory issues seems to point to any rationale  for  putting reasons in particular  at the  centre  stage.  So even if these metaethical accounts succeed in explaining reasons in terms of judgments about reasons, neither supports an explanatory turn to reasons in particular. I conclude that there seems to be no account of explanations of reasons in  terms  concerning  reasons  which  would  support  an  explanatory  turn  to reasons.  But  this  conclusion  requires  a  caveat.  It  can  be  introduced  by considering (theoretical) reasons for belief. It is  plausible that theoretical  and practical reasons involve normative reason relations of the same type. But it seems that the demand to explain why some  fact  (e.g.,  that  there  is  loud music  and chatter  coming from  across  the street) is a reason for some belief (e.g., that the neighbors are having a party) might be easily met by something like the following explanatory schema: given the fact in question (plus some body of background information or facts), the proposition which is the content of the belief is likely to be true.  Where such explanations  are  best  located  in  this  paper's  framework  for  explanations  of reasons deserves a fuller discussion than I can give it here. But I suspect that  truth and probability, and concepts of epistemic utility constructed out of them, aren't  themselves  normative  notions.  (They  are,  of  course,  co-opted  into normative  standards  in  epistemology.)  Thus  it  would  seem  that  either explanations  of  reasons  for  belief  in  terms  of  truth  and  probability  are explanations  in  terms  of  non-normative  factors  or  that  probability-raising considerations count as reasons for belief only if, and because, false belief is in some sense bad and true belief good (at least when the truths are non-trivial and sufficiently important or interesting). judgments about reasons, they also think that the attitude expressed by such judgments  – the attitude of counting P as favoring φ-ing in C – can be described without using the concept of a reason. But this prong of expressivist accounts of reasons doesn't seem to be  meant to furnish the sorts of explanations of normative reasons on which I focus  here.
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The caveat to my conclusion above is that this second option might not have to violate the NF constraint. Some philosophers think that something like the  explanatory  schema  above  follows  from  the  very  nature  of  belief  as  an attitude which has a “constitutive aim” of truth.44 If fact F makes proposition P likely to be true (or is otherwise indicative of the truth of P), then F is a reason to believe P, given what belief is. The status of a fact as a reason for belief could thus be explicable in terms of some norms of reason which somehow derive from the aim of truth and by which belief is constitutively regulated. True belief might then be held to be good in the sense of according with such norms of reason. This might come close enough to counting as an explanation of reasons for belief in terms concerning reasons. Whether a general explanatory turn to reasons has a significant option here depends on the prospects for similar explanations of why certain facts are reasons for action, intention, and desire,  for the various reactive and affective attitudes,  and,  on  the  theoretical  side,  for  attitudes  such  as  supposing  and guessing.  The bet would be that actions (and so on) also have some or other “constitutive aim”45 and, moreover, that reasons for action (and so on) can be explained in terms of that aim. It is highly controversial that acting and a variety of attitudes for which there can be reasons each have a constitutive aim to begin with,  and that if  they do,  that aim is of  the right sort and sufficiently rich to ground and explain a sufficiently wide range of reasons for action.46 I  suspect that making all this plausible will prove too tall of an order. But here I can only  note the caveat that this is an option for an explanatory turn to reasons which my arguments don't rule out. Its assessment must be left for future work. 
44 The literature on the “aim of belief” is large, but see e.g. Velleman (2000: ch. 11) and Wedgwood (2002).45 The literature on the “constitutive aim of action” is again large, but see e.g. Velleman (2000: ch. 6-8 and “Introduction”), Korsgaard (2009), and, for one representative critical discussion, Enoch (2006). 46 Various specifications of such constitutive aims would be of the wrong sort to suit an explanatory  turn  to  reasons.  If  the  constitutive  aim  of  action  were  the  good,  then explanations of reasons for action in terms of this aim would violate the NF constraint.  And  would it  be  informative  and non-circular  for  an  explanatory  turn  to  reasons  to exploit a constitutive aim of action if that aim were acting in accordance with reasons?
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8. ConclusionFor all that this paper shows, there may be constitutive explanations of reasons which satisfy the NF constraint  without pushing towards reductionism about reasons. I may simply have failed to find them. But it is far from clear where to  look  for  such  explanations,  save  perhaps  for  controversial  ideas  about constitutive aims of action, belief, and all the other attitudes for which there are reasons. Thus it seems fair to cast my discussion as a challenge to those who find themselves  sympathetic  to  an  explanatory  turn  to  reasons  to  construct  such explanations.  My aim has been to force  such philosophers into a  choice  that many of them wouldn't like: either endorse reductionism about reasons or abort the turn to reasons in particular. The concerns over explanation of evaluative and normative facts which fuel this challenge are, as I have noted, quite general. It is therefore possible that  the considerations I have given can be recruited to generate parallel challenges against  proposals  to  take  some  other  factors  than  reasons  as  explanatorily fundamental in the normative domain. I don't particularly worry that this means that my discussion shows too much for my purposes. If everyone faces a certain problem over explaining evaluative and normative facts, that doesn't mean that no one has a problem. And in fact nothing I say here challenges reductionism as a general  explanatory  hypothesis  regarding  evaluative  and  normative  facts. Whether and to what extent  reductive explanations of various evaluative and normative facts or notions are plausible depends on such further issues as how well  those explanations  can capture the  evaluative  or  normative  character  of these facts or notions. Some people might be inclined to conclude instead that the constraints on  explaining  evaluative  and  normative  facts  must  be  weaker  than  the  NF constraint and its analogues. That would affect the main thrust of this chapter. Although section 2 defends the idea that evaluative and normative facts typically call for explanation, the strength and scope of such a constraint clearly deserves further discussion. For what it is worth, my own inclination is to think that the 
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rational  intelligibility  of  normative  and  evaluative  distinctions  and  facts significantly constrains what can be regarded as brute in the normative domain and where no further explanation is possible. And, again for what it is worth, I suspect that if  there are evaluative or normative facts  which have no further explanation, they will concern more whether certain aspects of our situation in the world have some or other sort of normative significance, than whether the particular form which their significance takes is constitution of value, provision of reasons,  or  something else.  Thus the current fashion of  putting reasons at  centre stage in moral philosophy fails to strike me as a significant innovation in the important enterprise of explaining evaluative and normative phenomena. 
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